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12.1 Introduction
International attention to environmental issues has grown substantially during the 
past four decades, as the considerable development of international environmental law 
since the 1970s demonstrates. Global environmental concerns have emerged, such as 
the need to mitigate climate change, to protect biodiversity and endangered species, 
and to achieve sustainable development. The international community has realized 
that it must act to address important global environmental risks.
Implementation of environmental policies requires the adoption not just of 
environmental law but, in some circumstances, the adoption of trade regulations. 
For instance, to achieve environmental objectives, states may seek to control the 
physical properties of products sold in their internal markets, and thus the physi-
cal impact related to the use of such products, such as the pollution caused by the 
use of a car (product standards). However, in certain cases, the main environ-
mental impact of a product is not caused by its consumption or by its use, but 
rather by its production, such as the pollution caused by the manufacturing of a 
car. States may thus be willing to adopt environmental standards addressing the 
environmental impact caused by the ‘process and production methods’ (PPMs) 
of a particular good. When production occurs abroad, the only possibility for a 
state to address the environmental impact caused by production is to condition 
the possibility to import products into its market on the requirement that foreign 
producers comply with certain PPM standards. Trade restrictions based on PPMs 
may take the form of an import prohibition of certain products (eg, tuna caught in 
a manner harmful to dolphins,1 shrimps harvested by using methods that kill sea 
1 See, eg, GATT, United States— Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (3 September 1991) DS21/ R (una-
dopted) (US— Tuna I).
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turtles,2 or seals killed in a cruel way3). They can also represent a tax on imported 
products based on the environmental costs caused by the production of these 
products, such as the pollution emitted during their manufacturing process (eg, 
greenhouse gases emissions).
Traditionally, PPM trade restrictions have been viewed with suspicion under 
international trade rules, resulting in important tensions between environmen-
tal protection and trade liberalization.4 PPM measures may seem to be a useful 
or necessary tool to address the risks posed by pollution or environmental harm 
caused by the production of certain products. At the same time, the imposition 
of PPM measures increases barriers to trade, questions the right of the export-
ing country to choose its environmental policies, and may give rise to important 
compliance difficulties for certain developing countries.5 This chapter examines 
the evolution of the case law relating to the legality of PPM measures and how the 
respective visions of the future on which the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
are based have influenced the interpretation of international trade rules applicable 
to such measures.
12.2 The PPM Debate
A detailed discussion of the intense controversies regarding the legality of PPM 
measures under multilateral trade rules goes beyond the scope of this chapter.6 In 
brief, as far as WTO law is concerned, the debate has focused on two main aspects. 
The first is whether differences in PPMs might be relevant in the examination of 
whether two products are ‘like’ in the sense of the non- discrimination obligations 
contained in Articles I and III of the GATT. Article I, the Most- Favoured- Nation 
2 See WTO, United States— Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (15 May 
1998) WT/ DS58/ R (US— Shrimp I); WTO, United States— Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (12 October 1998) WT/ DS58/ AB/ R (US— Shrimp II).
3 See WTO, European Communities— Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (18 June 2014) WT/ DS400/ R, WT/ DS401/ R (EC— Seal Products).
4 As it has been described elsewhere, the word ‘protection’ ‘warms the hearts of environmental-
ists but sends chills down the spines of free traders’. See D Esty, Greening the GATT (Institute for 
International Economics 1994) 36.
5 See, eg, the view expressed by developing countries which are part of the Group of 77 South 
Summit, ‘Declaration of the South Summit’, 12– 14 April 2000, para 21. ‘While recognizing the value 
of environmental protection, labour standards … and protection of all universally recognized human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, … we reject all attempts to use these issues as conditionalities for 
restricting market access or aid and technology flows to developing countries.’
6 For a discussion of the PPM debate, see, eg, S Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” 
in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ (1998) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 59; RE 
Hudec, ‘The Product– Process Distinction in GATT/ WTO Jurisprudence’ in M Bronckers and R Quick 
(eds), New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (Kluwer Law 
International 2000) 187 ff; R Howse and D Regan, ‘The Product/ Process Distinction— An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 
249; CR Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO: Interfacing Trade and Social Goals 
(Cambridge University Press 2011). See also D Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods 
(PPMs) in WTO Law (PhD thesis forthcoming).
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clause, essentially provides that any advantage granted by an importing member to 
any imported product originating in any other member must be accorded to like 
imported products originating in all other members. Article III, which articulates 
the National Treatment obligation, provides that imported products must not be 
granted less favourable treatment than like domestic products. Thus, if two prod-
ucts can be considered as unlike on the basis of their respective PPMs, the Most- 
Favoured- Nation and National Treatment obligations will not apply.
The second main debate concerns the issue of whether PPM measures, which 
otherwise violate Articles I and III can nonetheless be justified under the general 
exceptions provision of Article XX of the GATT and thus be considered to com-
ply with the GATT.7 In this context, various arguments have been invoked to 
justify a prohibition of PPM measures under the GATT. On the one hand, it has 
been claimed that PPM measures conflict with the principle of state sovereignty. 
Some have argued that PPM measures are extraterritorial, since they apply to con-
duct occurring abroad8 and that they constitute interference in the internal affairs 
of the exporting country.9 PPM measures have been particularly strongly criti-
cized when developed states have adopted or considered adopting PPM measures 
against developing countries, which do not necessarily have the same environ-
mental priorities or the same responsibilities as developed nations in the particular 
environmental threat in issue.10 This is particularly apparent in the climate change 
context.
On the other hand, it has also been claimed that PPM measures could repre-
sent a threat to the basic objectives of the multilateral trading system. One of the 
main achievements of the GATT has been the significant reduction of tariff levels 
applicable to manufactured goods, from an average of forty per cent in 1947, to 
7 The PPM controversy also includes debates concerning the applicability and consequences of the 
rules of the TBT and SPS Agreements for PPM measures. See, eg, Conrad, Processes and Production 
Methods (PPMs) in WTO (n 6) 374 ff.
8 See TJ Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing 
Search for Reconciliation’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 268, 279 f; B Jansen and 
M Lugard, ‘Some Considerations on Trade Barriers Erected for Non- Economic Reasons and WTO 
Obligations’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Environmental Law 530, 533 ff; K Bagwell, P Mavroidis, 
and RW Staiger, ‘It’s a Question of Market Access’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 
56, 76; H Horn and P Mavroidis, ‘The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies’ (2008) 
42 Journal of International Environmental Law 1107, 1125 et passim. See also GATT, United States— 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (16 June 1994) DS29/ R (unadopted) (US— Tuna II) para 5.17. For 
a contrary position, see A Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking States’ Rights to Promote Extra- Territorial 
Environmental Values’ in F Weiss et al (eds), International Economic Law with a Human Face (Kluwer 
Law International 1998) 189; Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/ Process Distinction’ (n 6) 274 and 278; 
E Vranes, Trade and the Environment (OUP 2009) 166.
9 A majority of commentators have concluded that in principle trade restrictions do not violate the 
principle of non- intervention, except in very exceptional circumstances, such as when the producing 
country is largely dependent on exports. See A Appleton, Environmental Labelling Programmes (The 
Graduate Institute 1997) 83; D Luff, Le droit de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (Bruylant and 
LGDJ 2004) 158 f; BJ Condon, Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO (Transnational Publishers 
2006) 253.
10 See J Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’ (1992) 
49 Washington and Lee Law Review 1227, 1230; F Bierman, ‘The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in 
World Trade Law’ (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 421, 433; Esty, Greening the GATT (n 4) 184. See 
also the Group of 77 South Summit, ‘Declaration of the South Summit’ (n5) para 21.
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around three per cent for industrialized countries after the Uruguay Round, which 
concluded in 1995.11 As a result, the attention has gradually shifted to non- tariff 
barriers, such as domestic regulations in the field of safety, health, consumer, or 
environmental protection. Such regulations currently represent the principal bar-
riers to trade and the main source of protectionism.12 This is because foreign pro-
ducers may have difficulty in meeting the standards set by the importing country 
and because even prima facie non- discriminatory measures can be designed so as 
to burden imports or products originating from a particular country more heavily, 
thereby resulting in de facto discrimination. PPM measures represent a form of 
technical barrier to trade and some fear that allowing states to require the adoption 
of specific environmental practices in the exporting country would be like open-
ing a ‘Pandora’s box’ and would represent a ‘slippery slope’, by which trade rules 
would actually allow the adoption of regulations that represent significant obstacles 
to trade.13 Based on these considerations, it has been argued by some that PPM 
measures should be prohibited under trade rules.14
Yet, the prohibition of PPM measures could, in practice, result in the inability 
of states to address international and global environmental problems. When the 
source of environmental harm is located abroad, the most efficient measures are 
those which allow intervention at the source (first- best solutions).15 This can only 
be achieved through cooperation between the different states concerned. However, 
as demonstrated by the international climate change negotiations, effective interna-
tional cooperation to address global environmental problems has often proved to be 
particularly difficult to achieve. In the absence of this cooperation, trade measures 
are usually the only possible means by which a state may intervene (second- best 
solutions),16 in particular to sanction non- compliance with international obli-
gations or free riding by other states which refuse to participate in international 
efforts.17 If such sanctions are prohibited under trade rules, the dominant strategy 
for states remains non- cooperation, which leads to a classical and economically 
suboptimal prisoner’s dilemma situation. Such cooperation failure may then lead to 
the ‘tragedy of the commons’,18 ie degradation or destruction of global ecosystems 
11 See MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, ‘Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling 
Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics’ (1998) 6 European Journal of Law and Economics 5, 6; 
D Carreau and P Juillard, Droit international économique (3rd edn, Dalloz 2007) 185 f.
12 See Carreau and Juillard, ibid, 187.
13 See J Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalisation (OUP 2004) 154 f; Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and 
Environmental Policies’ (n 10) 1241 f. See also GATT Secretariat, ‘Trade and the Environment’ in 
International Trade 1990– 1991, Vol 1 (Geneva 1992). ‘If the door were opened to use trade policies 
unilaterally to offset the competitiveness effects of different environmental standards, or to attempt to 
force other countries to adopt domestically favoured practices and policies, the trading system would 
start down a very slippery slope.’
14 See eg GATT Secretariat, ibid. This document explains that PPM measures should be excluded 
because otherwise it ‘would invite a flood of import restrictions’.
15 See, eg, TA Pugel, International Economics (Irwin McGraw- Hill 2009) 272.
16 ibid, 281.
17 See, eg, S Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty- Making (OUP 
2007) 314 et passim.
18 See the famous article of G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243.
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or shared resources. Thus, in brief, a prohibition of PPM measures may reinforce 
the risks of states’ cooperation failures in the field of international environmental 
protection and the risks of global environmental crises.
Hence, while some have objected to the legality of PPM measures under the 
GATT for trade and development reasons, others have opposed the prohibition of 
such measures under WTO law based on environmental grounds.
12.3 Competing Imageries of the Future
The debate on the legality of PPM measures can be placed within a broader context 
in which interests relating to environmental protection, development, and trade 
co- exist. The PPM debate may be viewed as one involving competing opinions as to 
the nature, scope, and scale of the different risks at stake and as a debate as to which 
interests should ultimately prevail. These different views are influenced in part by 
competing imageries of the future.
A first image is that of economic prosperity. Developing countries, for example, 
may be seen as imagining a future in which they have achieved economic develop-
ment, eradicated poverty, and guaranteed their citizens’ basic needs, such as educa-
tion or healthcare. Developing countries may have great difficulty in complying 
with environmental standards adopted by developed states because of the gener-
ated additional costs, or simply because of the lack of means to verify compliance 
with PPM requirements. The use of a particular production method usually does 
not influence the physical properties of a product (so- called non- product- related 
PPMs). Therefore, producing countries have to establish verification mechanisms 
to certify compliance with the prescribed PPM standards. Developing countries 
tend to see the means and costs necessary to implement such certification proce-
dures as important obstacles to trade, or at least as interference with their own social 
and economic preferences.19 As a result, they often consider the adoption of PPM 
measures by importing countries as entailing risks for their economic development 
and the achievement of their vision of a prosper future.
A similar view may be taken by those who favour free trade. As far as inter-
national trade is concerned, free traders basically imagine a world in which the 
absence of trade barriers enables states to maximize their comparative advantages 
and wealth.20 This increased wealth should then eventually provide states with the 
additional means necessary to tackle environmental problems. On this view, state 
regulations, including for non- economic purposes, are seen as a risk or threat to the 
achievement of this objective, insofar as they represent forms of technical barriers 
to trade, which tend to jeopardize trade liberalization.
Thus, both free traders and developing countries which oppose the use of PPM 
measures agree on the view that priority should be given to trade and economic 
19 See Biermann, ‘The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law’ (n 10) 433.
20 See, eg, J Jackson, The World Trading System (The MIT Press 1997) 237.
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development, in order to achieve a prosperous economic future. They argue that 
regulations, which put the pursuit of that future at risk, such as environmental 
regulations, should be eliminated. Environmental problems will eventually be 
addressed in this economically prosperous future, with the additional means that 
will be at states’ disposal when this future is achieved.
The contrasting image, relied on by proponents of the use of PPM measures, 
tends to imagine a future in which the environment has been preserved, both at 
the regional and global levels. Proponents of this vision recognize that failure to 
address global environmental problems today may eventually lead to catastrophic 
environmental futures. These risks may concern the international community as a 
whole, at least when global environmental risks are concerned (climate change, bio-
diversity, species extinction, overexploitation of common fish stocks, etc), although 
agreement on the nature, intensity, and extent of these risks or on the need and 
means by which to address them may not be uniform. 21 In any event, the means 
to achieve this ‘green’ future is considered to be through environmental regulation 
aimed, among other things, at correcting existing market failures.22 On this view, 
the expansion of international trade is perceived with suspicion. First, increased 
production and transport may exacerbate environmental stress. Second, it is some-
times feared that international trade rules, if unconstrained, could favour environ-
mentally unsound production practices from ‘pollution havens’.23 Environmental 
trade measures are thus perceived as a way to reduce these risks and to achieve a 
‘green’ future.
Thus, depending on the particular vision of the future adhered to, perceptions 
of the relative importance of the environmental, trade, and development risks at 
stake differ. The issue of the legality of PPM measures encapsulates the conflict 
between those who consider that too little constraint of such measures could jeop-
ardize the functioning of the multilateral trading system and those who consider 
that overly stringent focus on trade disciplines could prevent states from achieving 
effective international environmental protection, leading to global environmental 
21 For instance, the United States and the European Communities did not agree, in the WTO 
EC— Hormone case (WTO, European Communities— Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
[Hormones] (13 February 1998) WT/ DS26/ AB/ R, WT/ DS48/ AB/ R (EC— Hormone)), on whether 
hormone- treated beef represented an externality and whether that externality had to be internalized. 
This dispute concerned two developed countries and mainly concerned health issues. Yet, this case is 
interesting insofar as it showed, as Pauwelyn has pointed out, that the fundamental issue in this dis-
pute was whether there was a need for the government to intervene at all or whether the market could 
deal with the problem. J Pauwelyn, ‘Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still 
Haunt the WTO’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 575, 579.
22 On the economic justification for state intervention in cases of market failures see, eg, JE Stiglitz 
and CE Walsh, Economics (4th edn, WW Norton 2006) 252.
23 See Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment’ (n 8) 288– 89; AL 
Strauss, ‘From GATTzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of 
the World Trade Organization’ (1998) 19 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law 769, 808; M Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn, Routledge 
2005) 661.
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degradation. Section 12.4 examines how these different visions of the future have 
been visible in GATT and WTO case law.
12.4 Evolutions of the GATT and WTO Case Law  
on PPM Measures
One of the most notable disputes relating to trade and the environment, which 
was examined by two GATT 1947 panels at the beginning of the 1990s, con-
cerned a US embargo on Mexican tuna that was caught in a manner that resulted 
in the incidental killings of dolphins.24 The measure adopted by the United States 
also provided for a secondary embargo applying to all third countries that did not 
prohibit imports of tuna from Mexico. This secondary embargo was challenged 
under the GATT by the European Communities.25 In 1998, after the creation of 
the WTO, a similar dispute arose when the United States prohibited the impor-
tation of shrimp caught in a manner which harmed sea turtles. In effect, the US 
legislation required shrimp- producing countries that exported shrimp products 
to the United States to adopt regulations mandating the use of fishing methods 
that did not harm sea turtles. This measure was challenged before the WTO 
by four Asian shrimp- exporting countries.26 These different cases all concerned 
measures which prescribed the use, in the exporting country, of particular PPMs 
(in both cases relating to fishing methods), which did not physically affect the 
final product, giving rise to an intense debate as to the legality of the measures.27
The panels in these cases examined whether the PPM measures concerned 
could comply with Article XX of the GATT, which sets out a list of public policy 
goals which may be invoked to justify a measure that infringes GATT obligations. 
However, environmental protection is not one of the public policy goals listed. 
For this reason, environmental concerns have, in general, been examined in dis-
pute settlement practice under subparagraph (b), which applies to the protection 
of human, animal, or plant life or health, and subparagraph (g), which concerns 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Since Article XX of the GATT 
does not explicitly refer to PPM measures, and because of the omission of refer-
ence to environmental goals in this provision, the legal regime applicable to envi-
ronmental PPM measures depends in large part on how Article XX of the GATT 
is interpreted in the case law; and this depends on competing interpretations of 
the basic concepts underlying multilateral trade rules and competing visions and 
imageries of the future these trade rules are designed to achieve and serve.
24 See US— Tuna I; US— Tuna II. 25 See US— Tuna II.
26 See US— Shrimp I; US— Shrimp II.
27 See, eg, Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO’ (n 6); Hudec, ‘The 
Product– Process Distinction in GATT/ WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 6); Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/ 
Process Distinction’ (n 6); J Jackson, ‘Comments on Shrimp/ Turtle and the Product/ Process Distinction’ 
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 303.
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12.4.1  First phase: the GATT 1947 and the Tuna— Dolphin cases
The reports in the Tuna— Dolphin cases were not adopted by the contracting par-
ties, because of the opposition of the United States. (Under the GATT 1947, posi-
tive consensus was required for the adoption of a panel report.) These reports thus 
have no legal force as such.28 However, they have had indirect influence in that 
they have been quoted by subsequent reports29 and have given rise to considerable 
debates in academic writings.30 In the Tuna— Dolphin reports, the panels expressed 
the view that if the GATT allowed an importing member to adopt trade meas-
ures to force other members to change their environmental policies within their 
own jurisdiction, the GATT could ‘no longer serve as a multilateral framework for 
trade among contracting parties’.31 One of the main concerns was that accepting 
such a rule could mean that the GATT would provide legal certainty only between 
members with identical internal regulations.32 The Shrimp— Turtle panel was simi-
larly concerned with conflicting requirements between several importing countries 
applying to the same subject for the same exporting countries, making it impossible 
for the states concerned to comply with all of these requirements at the same time.33 
The panel emphatically stated that allowing such measures could ‘rapidly lead to 
the end of the WTO multilateral trading system’.34
In an effort to exclude the perceived risks for the multilateral trading system aris-
ing from the use of PPM measures, the panel reports in both cases suggested that 
the drastic solution of prohibiting PPM measures should be applied. There was no 
assessment of the environmental risks at stake in these cases, which seemed to be 
irrelevant in the view of the panels.
The prohibition of PPM measures based on the ‘risks for the multilateral trading 
system’ has been heavily criticized in academic writings which have, for example, 
referred to ‘fabricated illogical reasons’ as to why Article XX of the GATT could 
not be used to justify unilateral PPM measures.35 It has been pointed out that 
the panels’ attitude could be counterproductive and could actually threaten the 
multilateral trading system by triggering concerns as to the system’s hostile atti-
tude towards broader public interests.36 Indeed, precisely such hostile reactions 
did occur after the release of the Tuna— Dolphin reports. At that time, free- trade 
28 See WTO Japan— Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (1 November 1996) WT/ DS8/ AB/ R, WT/ DS10/ 
AB/ R, WT/ DS11/ AB/ R, 15 (Japan— Alcohol II). The Appellate Body, however, stated that unadopted 
reports could provide ‘useful guidance’. Japan— Alcohol II, 16.
29 See, eg, US— Shrimp I, paras 7.16, 7.36, 7.46; WTO, European Communities— Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products (5 April 2001) WT/ DS135/ R, paras 8.37, 8.167, 
8.272; Panel Report, United States— Measures Affecting the Cross- Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (20 April 2005) WT/ DS285/ R, para 6.526.
30 See, eg, Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO’ (n 6); Hudec, ‘The 
Product– Process Distinction in GATT/ WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 6); Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/ 
Process Distinction’ (n 6); Jackson, The World Trading System (n 20); Conrad, Processes and Production 
Methods (PPMs) in WTO (n 6).
31 US— Tuna II, para 5.26; US— Tuna I, para 5.28. 32 See US— Tuna I, para 5.27.
33 See US— Shrimp I, para 7.45. 34 ibid.
35 See S Charnovitz, ‘The WTO’s Environmental Progress’ (2007) 10 Journal of International 
Environmental Law 685, 696.
36 ibid.
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critics used the expression of ‘GATTzilla’ to describe what was perceived as a trad-
ing system which threatened environmental protection and state sovereignty.37 In 
the eyes of these critics, the GATT unduly restricted GATT members’ regulatory 
autonomy and entailed risks of preventing governmental action to address global 
environmental issues.38 Important risks of cooperation failures could ensue, lead-
ing to international inaction in the field of environmental protection, because the 
imports of products produced by non- cooperating states, using environmentally 
harmful PPMs, could not be restricted under international trade law rules. So was 
the argument.
12.4.2  Second phase: the WTO and the Shrimp— Turtle Appellate 
Body Report
In 1998, only a few years after the Tuna— Dolphin cases, and in the first years of the 
newly created WTO, the issue of the legality of PPM measures under multilateral 
trade rules was brought again before the WTO in the Shrimp— Turtle case. The 
Appellate Body adopted a different approach from that of the Tuna— Dolphin and 
Shrimp— Turtle panels. It held that conditioning access to a member’s domestic 
market on whether exporting members comply with a policy unilaterally prescribed 
by the importing member might be a ‘common aspect’ of measures falling within 
the scope of one of subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT.39 Implicitly, the 
Appellate Body rejected the argument that a perceived ‘threat’ to the multilateral 
trading system was an element that was relevant to the interpretation of the GATT. 
This finding had far- reaching consequences for PPM measures, since it implied that 
their ‘unilateral’ or ‘coercive’ character would not, of itself, render such measures 
incapable of justification.
In this dispute, the United States initially lost on appeal under Article XX of 
the GATT, in particular because of the lack of flexibility in the methods that could 
be used by exporting countries to protect sea turtles during shrimp trawling, the 
violation of due process requirements relating to the transparency of the certifica-
tion procedures, and because the United States had negotiated an international 
37 See Esty, Greening the GATT (n 4) 35 ff. Critics of the Tuna— Dolphin reports invoking state sov-
ereignty have referred in particular to the right of states to choose the conditions upon which products 
may be sold on their internal market. It should be pointed out that GATT members which opposed the 
use of PPM measures have also invoked state sovereignty, in particular the principle of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources. In their view, this principle means that importing states cannot impose 
on imported products PPM standards that conflict with the right of exporting countries to exploit their 
natural resources as they choose to. This issue is part of the wider debate about whether PPM measures 
are extraterritorial in a legal sense and whether the customary international law rules on prescriptive 
jurisdiction restrict the ability of states to adopt PPM measures. See, eg, Sifonios, Environmental Process 
and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law (n 6).
Reactions to the reports in the US— Shrimp case were less critical. See, eg, Charnovitz, ‘The WTO’s 
Environmental Progress’ (n 35) 696. He states that through its US— Shrimp report, among other 
reports, the Appellate Body ‘sent a signal to the public that the era of runaway panels on environmental 
matters was over’.
38 See, eg, Strauss, ‘From GATTzilla to the Green Giant’ (n 23) 771.
39 US— Shrimp II, para 121.
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agreement on sea turtle protection with some of its trading partners prior to the 
imposition of the import ban, but not with the complainants.40 In the view of 
the Appellate Body these different elements constituted ‘arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination’ between the exporting countries concerned, in the sense of the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. Eventually, three years after the initial case, 
after the United States had made similar negotiation efforts with the complaining 
members and had adopted a more flexible measure which allowed the use of sea tur-
tle protection methods that were comparable in effectiveness, the Appellate Body 
upheld the contested measure.41
The Shrimp— Turtle Appellate Body’s report thus applied a much more subtle 
and balanced approach to the respective risks of stringent or lax trade rules for 
the functioning of the multilateral trading system and the ability of states to take 
environmental trade measures: PPM measures are not GATT illegal per se, but 
the different conditions of Article XX of the GATT discipline the ability of WTO 
members to enact such measures.42
12.4.3  Subsequent evolutions of case law
The reports in the Shrimp— Turtle case have shown that PPM measures were not 
illegal per se in WTO law. However, the precise conditions under which such meas-
ures are justifiable, and the way competing interests and risks should be taken into 
account in the application of the relevant provisions, have often remained unclear 
since this dispute. Nevertheless, the case law relating to Articles III and XX of the 
GATT has continued to evolve. In particular, several cases have concerned the rela-
tion between international trade rules and non- economic objectives, such as health,43 
environmental protection,44 or public morality.45 These cases have provided certain 
clarifications on the legal regime applicable to PPM measures. For the limited pur-
pose of this chapter, however, it is not necessary to explain the details of this complex 
case law. Rather, certain specific aspects will be highlighted in the following sections.
40 ibid, paras 161– 76.
41 See WTO, United States— Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia (22 October 2001) WT/ DS58/ AB/ RW, (US— Shrimp 21.5).
42 The Appellate Body held in its US— Shrimp II report that the importing country must in particu-
lar show that a ‘sufficient nexus’ exists with the environmental situation at stake; US— Shrimp II, para 
133. It has to establish that it has conducted ‘across- the- board’ international negotiations in order to 
conclude an international environmental agreement; US— Shrimp II, para 166. It must also ensure that 
its measure is flexible enough to take into account differing conditions that may occur in the importing 
and exporting countries; US— Shrimp II, para 161.
43 See WTO, European Communities— Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products 
(5 April 2001)  WT/ DS135/ AB/ R (EC— Asbestos); WTO, Brazil— Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres (17 December 2007) WT/ DS332/ AB/ R (Brazil— Tyres).
44 See WTO, United States— Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products (13 June 2012) WT/ DS381/ AB/ R. This case still concerned the dispute between the 
United States and Mexico on the legality of the ‘dolphin- safe’ label on tuna products. This second 
dispute between the two countries, after the 1991 GATT Panel report, was examined under the rules 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
45 See EC— Seal Products. The case concerned an embargo of the European Union on seals and seal 
products, justified on the basis of the cruelty of the way seals were killed.
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12.5 The Evolution of Case Law in the Light of Imageries of 
the Future
When the WTO was created in 1995, the GATT 1947 was integrated into the 
WTO agreements without changes to its text. In other words, the evolution of the 
case law regarding the legality of PPM measures, described in section12.4, has not 
been based on any changes in the relevant provisions of the GATT. It can be argued 
that it is instead a change in the vision of the future underlying the multilateral 
trading system that explains this evolution, at least in part.
The GATT 1947 indicates in its Preamble that this agreement has the objective 
of developing the ‘full use of the resources of the world’. At the end of the 1940s, the 
focus of the GATT signatories was clearly on developing international trade, not 
on the linkage between trade and environmental protection. The GATT was thus 
founded on the vision of a ‘free- trade future’ described in section 12.3 above. In a 
way, the 1991 and 1994 Tuna— Dolphin reports, even though they were delivered 
more than forty years later, still illustrated this conception in which the GATT was 
seen in complete isolation from other international concerns, and in which the 
reduction of obstacles to trade was seen as the prevailing objective of the world trad-
ing system. In such a view, there was little room for environmental interests, at least 
when they entailed the imposition of non- consensual trade restrictions. In order to 
eliminate the risks that trade measures unduly restricted trade liberalization, GATT 
rules were interpreted as prohibiting PPM measures, without consideration of the 
risks of catastrophic environmental futures entailed by such an approach.
As mentioned, when the WTO agreements were adopted in 1995, the text 
of the GATT 1947 was not modified. However, the Preamble of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement) introduced an important 
concept, by stating that one of the objectives of the multilateral trading system was 
to allow the ‘optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development’.46
The Appellate Body held in the Shrimp— Turtle case that the objective of sustain-
able development has to be taken into account in the interpretation of WTO law. In 
46 See the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement:
The Parties to this Agreement, recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and eco-
nomic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensur-
ing full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at dif-
ferent levels of economic development (...)
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered 
into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 154, Preamble (WTO Agreement).
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its view, sustainable development ‘must add colour, texture and shading’ to its inter-
pretation of WTO agreements.47 Yet, the WTO agreements contain no definition 
of sustainable development and the Appellate Body has not provided any details 
as to what sustainable development actually means, nor has it explicitly explained 
how it could add ‘colour, texture and shading’ to the interpretation of these agree-
ments. Furthermore, there is no uniform definition of sustainable development in 
international law or any consensus on how to give it concrete effect in individual 
cases,48 which could guide the treaty interpreter as to the way the principle of sus-
tainable development could influence in practical terms the interpretation of the 
GATT provisions. It is, however, generally acknowledged in the academic literature 
and relevant legal documents that one of the most important aspects of sustainable 
development is the principle of integration, which means that sustainable develop-
ment should achieve the integration of environmental protection and economic 
development.49 Another important element is the principle of inter- generational 
equity, which states that ‘sustainable development is development that meets the 
needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs’.50
Despite the vague character of the principle of sustainable development, it could 
be argued that through this principle, WTO members have contemplated a very 
general common vision of the future. As the terms used in the Preamble of the WTO 
Agreement show, such vision may be viewed as one which seeks to reconcile the two 
competing imageries of the future that underlie the PPM debate. By referring to 
the objective to ‘protect and preserve the environment and enhance the means for 
doing so’, the WTO Agreement Preamble refers, at the same time, to a vision of a 
future in which the global environment has been preserved and a vision of a future 
in which international trade has, through economic prosperity, brought additional 
means to protect the environment. The term ‘optimal’ use of the world’s resources 
also indicates the need to find a balance between competing risks and interests in 
order to develop international trade without harming the environment in the long 
run. In brief, the achievement of this common vision of the future, represented by 
sustainable development, requires that the treaty interpreter achieve some form of 
trade- off between competing risks (risk/ risk trade- offs).
Several concrete aspects of the Appellate Body’s case law may in practice be inter-
preted as attempts to take into consideration competing risks; ie, to achieve such risk/ 
risk trade- offs. On the one hand, trade liberalization and the reduction of obstacles to 
trade remain one of the most important bases of the GATT. It could be argued that it 
has directly influenced the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the National Treatment 
obligation, in particular in relation to the concept of ‘like products’. The Appellate 
47 US— Shrimp II, para 153.
48 See P Birnie, A Boyle, and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 
2009) 125.
49 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, ‘Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development’ (3– 4 June 1992) A/ CONF.151/ 26 (Vol I), 
principle 4 (Rio Declaration). See also Birnie et al, ibid, 116.
50 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 43.
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Body has endorsed an economic definition of this concept, which focuses on the com-
petitive relationship between products in the marketplace.51 It has thus rejected the 
view that two products could be considered to be unlike simply because they have, 
say, different environmental impacts,52 at least as long as such impact does not influ-
ence consumers’ tastes and habits and thus the competitive relationship between the 
products concerned.
On the other hand, environmental interests are taken into account through the 
application of Article XX of the GATT. This provision was interpreted narrowly 
under the GATT 1947.53 As a result, compliance with the conditions of Article XX, 
in particular its necessity test, were particularly difficult to achieve.54 By contrast, 
several aspects of the Appellate Body report in the Shrimp— Turtle case show a much 
more balanced and flexible approach. First, as indicated above, the Appellate Body 
has confirmed that a PPM measure could comply with the GATT, if certain condi-
tions are met.55 In brief, this case has shown that environmental risks (in this case, 
the risk of extinction of an endangered species) can justify a restrictive trade measure, 
provided that the regulating member minimizes unnecessary trade impacts.
Beside this general aspect, which may be viewed as a form of integration of trade 
and environmental interests, a second specific example could be mentioned. In its 
report, the Appellate Body held that turtles were ‘exhaustible natural resources’ in 
the sense of Article XX(g) of the GATT.56 Complainants in this case had argued 
that this exception had been construed by the drafters of the GATT as applying 
to non- living natural resources such as minerals and not to living resources. The 
Appellate Body applied what has been referred to as an evolutionary interpreta-
tion57 to include non- living resources in the scope of Article XX(g) of the GATT. 
In its analysis, the Appellate Body explicitly referred to the objective of sustainable 
development mentioned in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement as one of the 
bases of its interpretation.58
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has interpreted the conditions of Article XX of 
the GATT in a more flexible manner than that which prevailed under the GATT 
51 See Japan— Alcohol II, 16; EC— Asbestos, para 98.
52 See the rejection of the ‘aims- and- effects’ definition of ‘like’ products (under which two products 
are alike if the regulatory measure distinguishing between them pursues protectionist intent and results 
in protectionist effects) in the Japan— Alcohol case. WTO, Japan— Taxes on Alcoholic Bevereges (11 July 
1996) WT/ DS8/ R, WT/ DS10/ R, WT/ DS11/ R (Japan— Alcohol I) paras 6.16– 6.18, Japan— Alcohol 
II, 16 (endorsing the economic definition of the concept of like products).
53 See, eg, US – Tuna I, para 5.22.
54 See, eg, A Appleton, ‘GATT Article XX’s Chapeau: A Disguised “Necessary” Test?: The WTO 
Appellate Body’s Ruling in United States— Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline’ 
(1997) 6 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 131, 136.
55 EC— Asbestos (n 43); Brazil— Tyres (n 43). 56 See US— Shrimp II, para 131.
57 ibid, para 130.
58 ibid, para 129. In this paragraph, the Appellate Body recalled that even though the words of 
Article XX(g) of the GATT were crafted fifty years earlier, they had to be read by the treaty interpreter 
in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about protection and conserva-
tion of the environment. It added that the signatories of the WTO Agreement were fully aware of 
the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection and that the Preamble of this agreement 
explicitly acknowledged the objective of sustainable development.
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1947 practice. For example, it has interpreted the necessity test applicable in par-
ticular in the context of subparagraph (b) as a ‘weighing and balancing’ test, by 
which the treaty interpreter takes into account the importance of the values and 
interests at stake, the contribution of the measure to the achievement of the goal, 
and its trade- restrictiveness.59 Through this interpretation, environmental risks and 
trade risks may each be considered, respectively, through the first and third criteria. 
In the view of the Appellate Body, the more important these non- trade interests are, 
the easier it would be to accept them as ‘necessary’.60 This shows that an assessment 
of the environmental risks at issue should be carried out to enable a proper applica-
tion of this ‘weighing and balancing’ test.
In the same vein, the Appellate Body has held that the conditions of the chapeau 
mean that the treaty interpreter needs to find a ‘line of equilibrium’ between the 
substantive obligations of the GATT and the general exceptions provision.61 The 
substantive obligations are meant to allow the achievement of the objective of trade 
liberalization. At the same time, the need to find a line of equilibrium between such 
obligations and the general exceptions provision, which introduces non- economic 
concerns that may compete with the objective of trade liberalization, shows that the 
GATT system allows some form of balance between competing interests and risks.
These examples illustrate how the objective of sustainable development, which 
may be viewed as a form of common vision of the future of WTO members, has 
influenced in concrete terms the Appellate Body case law.
12.6 The Limits of an Evolution of Case Law Based on   
a Common Vision of the Future
Even though the objective of sustainable development mentioned in the WTO 
Agreement Preamble has influenced the Appellate Body case law, a reference to such 
objective only gives the treaty interpreter a very general indication of the common 
vision of the future that should be achieved. The principle of sustainable develop-
ment remains vague and may not provide an answer to all the specific questions that 
arise in the search for a risk/ risk trade- off. Indeed, making a compromise between 
the different risks and interests at stake indirectly affects various underlying issues, 
such as what risks are relevant, whose risks eventually count, which risks may be 
given priority, and so on.
An interesting example is that of possible climate- related trade measures. Even 
though no such measures have been adopted to date, both the European Union 
and the United States have, at some point, considered the idea of imposing taxes on 
imported products based on the greenhouse gases emitted during their production 
59 See, eg, WTO, Korea— Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (17 February 1999) WT/ DS75/ AB/ R, WT/ 
DS84/ AB/ R, para 163; Brazil— Tyres, para 178.
60 See WTO, Korea— Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (10 January 
2001) WT/ DS161/ AB/ R, WT/ DS169/ AB/ R, para 162.
61 See US— Shrimp II, para 159.
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processes.62 If such measures were adopted and contested before the WTO, various 
competing risks would arise— for example, the risk that the absence of measures to 
reduce greenhouse gases could lead to catastrophic climate changes; the risk that 
the prohibition of climate- related trade measures could deprive states of meaning-
ful means to sanction states who do not cooperate in greenhouse gases emissions 
reductions or do not comply with their international commitments; the risk that a 
generally applicable tax or import prohibition would jeopardize the functioning of 
the multilateral trading system and lead to an increasing number of trade disputes, 
retaliations, and so on; the risk that the lack of financial and technical means of 
developing countries to implement the required measures could mean that they 
could either lose access to certain markets or reduce the resources allocated to other 
political priorities. The question is, which risks would be relevant, and which risks 
should be given priority?
All these risks exist to a certain extent and could potentially be relevant in the 
interpretation of international trade rules. Most of them may indeed be related 
directly or indirectly to the achievement of sustainable development. Taking a deci-
sion about the justifiability of a PPM measure inevitably has consequences for the 
respective importance of the competing risks at hand and for the issue of which risk 
may eventually prevail. Therefore, in the absence of clear rules about the way such 
competing interests and risks should be considered and integrated, recommenda-
tions of the panels and the Appellate Body on these issues will inevitably tend 
towards policy making rather than interpretation.
Two main consequences ensue. First, legal certainty may sometimes be elusive, 
at least as long as there is no confirmed practice in relation to the concrete manner 
in which risks relating to environmental protection and development should be 
integrated into trade interests, through an interpretation of trade rules congruent 
with the objective of sustainable development. Second, the margin of manoeuvre 
concerning the possible views about the influence that sustainable development 
should have on the interpretation of trade rules gives rise to the issue of the legiti-
macy of the panels and the Appellate Body to make interpretations which have a 
policy- making dimension.
Sensitive issues about how competing risks in relation to environmental pro-
tection, trade liberalization, or development, such as those mentioned above in 
relation to climate- related trade measures, should ideally be addressed through 
international negotiations between states and rest on solutions derived from con-
sensus. But the international community may not necessarily succeed in achieving 
effective international cooperation when global environmental issues are at stake. 
Hence, states may sometimes be willing to use unilateral measures to sanction free 
riding or non- compliance with international efforts to protect the environment. 
Where unilateral trade measures are imposed and are contested before the WTO, 
62 See, eg, J Bhagwati and PC Mavroidis, ‘Is Action against US Exports for Failure to Sign the Kyoto 
Protocol WTO Legal?’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 299; J Pauwelyn, ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy 
and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law’ (2007) Working 
Paper, Nicolas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University.
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it is in practice the panels and the Appellate Body which will be faced with the task 
of reviewing, through their examination of the relevant conditions of the GATT, 
whether the enactment of the contested measure takes appropriate account of the 
competing risks at stake.
However, under the terms of their mandate, the panels and the Appellate Body 
are not supposed to ‘add or diminish the rights and obligations’ provided in the 
WTO agreements.63 In practice though, in particular when rather vague concepts 
such as those used in Articles III and XX of the GATT have to be applied, the panels 
and the Appellate Body often actually make law,64 since their reports are automati-
cally adopted unless there is a consensus among all WTO members not to do so.65 
There is in theory the possibility of adopting a formal interpretation of the WTO 
Agreements through the ‘legislative’ institutions of the WTO (ie, the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council), but this requires a three- quarters majority 
of the members.66 In other words, checks and balances between the ‘judicial’ and 
‘legislative’ branches of the WTO are very difficult to use in practice. In such cir-
cumstances, the role of the panels and the Appellate Body is quite uncomfortable, 
since they may have no other choice, in the absence of clear rules in the relevant 
provisions, other than to make recommendations which tend towards law making 
(or policy making), without having a mandate to do so.
It might seem tempting for the panels and the Appellate Body, in such circum-
stances, to avoid exposing in a transparent way their opinion about which risks are 
relevant, whose risks count, and which risks may be given priority. When case law 
lacks transparency, diverging interpretations may easily be made, which means that 
the Appellate Body is less likely to be criticized for ‘making law’. For instance, while 
the Appellate Body did state that the function of the conditions of the introduc-
tory clause of Article XX of the GATT is to find a ‘line of equilibrium’ between the 
substantive obligations of the GATT and the general exceptions, it did not clearly 
identify the nature and extent of the competing risks and interests at stake in the 
Shrimp— Turtle case; nor did it explicitly weigh these different risks in its applica-
tion of the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.
However, it is submitted that a lack of transparency may actually reduce the 
legitimacy of case law. Indeed, transparency is an important aspect of legitimacy, 
since it allows a meaningful criticism of the case law.67 While the GATT provisions 
require the search for balanced solutions, in particular through the application of 
the necessity test (‘weighing and balancing test’) or the conditions of the chapeau 
(‘line of equilibrium’), transparency could be enhanced if clear risk assessments 
were conducted. These risk assessments could concern in particular environmental 
63 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 (DSU), art 3.2.
64 See AT Guzman, ‘Global Governance and the WTO’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law 
Journal 303, 341– 42.
65 See DSU, arts 16(4) and 17(14). 66 See WTO Agreement, art IX(2).
67 See, eg, R Howse, ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade 
Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence’ in JHH Weiler (ed), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA 
(OUP 2000) 35, 51 ff.
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risks and could allow the evaluation of the intensity of the environmental threat, 
the importance of the natural resources at stake, the scale and magnitude of pollu-
tion or degradation, and thus the urgency of intervention, and so on. As far as the 
risks for trade and development are concerned, the panels and the Appellate Body 
could focus on the trade- restrictiveness of the measure, the actual and potential 
effects of the measure on trade flows, the nature and importance of the trade inter-
ests at issue, the importance of the products concerned for the exporting countries 
concerned, and so on.
In the WTO dispute settlement bodies’ analyses of the conditions of Article XX 
of the GATT, these risk assessments could then serve as objective bases to explain 
how risk/ risk trade- offs are decided, for instance in the context of the examination 
of the conditions of the chapeau or the necessity test. There have been some evolu-
tions in the case law which tend to go in this direction, in particular the interpreta-
tion of the necessity test as a ‘weighing and balancing test’. As explained above, this 
test requires, inter alia, the examination of the importance of the interests and val-
ues underlying the measure, which may include the environmental risks concerned, 
and the analysis of the trade restrictiveness of the measure, which may involve the 
nature of the trade risks at hand. The necessity analysis could thus include a more 
detailed— or at least a more transparent— assessment of the risks at stake, which 
would then be useful in the appraisal of the different conditions of Article XX of 
the GATT, including the conditions of the introductory clause.
12.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that a change in the vision of the future underlying an 
international agreement may result in very concrete evolutions in a legal regime 
applicable to certain specific issues, without any modification of the actual text 
of the relevant provisions. In the trade context, this new vision— the achievement 
of sustainable development— has allowed a better consideration of environmental 
risks in the context of the GATT and the appraisal of trade- related environmental 
measures under Article XX of the GATT.
There are, however, limits to the evolution of GATT law based solely on the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions in the light of a new vision of the future. 
The vagueness of the terms used in these provisions may justify quite different 
interpretations, as the evolution of the case law about the concept of ‘like product’ 
or the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT has shown. Moreover, 
the objective of sustainable development— which is supposed, in the view of the 
Appellate Body, to bring ‘colour, texture and shading’ to the interpretation of these 
provisions— represents a rather vague concept, which may only provide very gen-
eral guidance to the treaty interpreter. It cannot provide much guidance as to the 
concrete and practical solutions needed to integrate the competing risks to the envi-
ronment, trade liberalization, or the interests of developing countries. As a result, 
the interpretation of these vague provisions in the light of this rather imprecise 
objective often tends towards law making.
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Yet, the mandate of the panels and the Appellate Body does not include the 
possibility of engaging in law making, as they must not ‘add or diminish the rights 
and obligations’ of WTO members under the WTO agreements. In such context, 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies are likely to seek to avoid as much as possible 
findings which might be perceived as law making. Thus, the contradiction which 
exists between the need to clarify the existing rules and the absence of mandate to 
create law represents a limit to the possibility to develop, through case law, clear and 
coherent rules about the integration of competing risks within the GATT system.
Eventually, the adoption of clear rules about the way the common vision of the 
future underlying the WTO system should be achieved and how competing risks 
should be taken into account may require international negotiation and the con-
clusion of an international agreement between WTO members. They could, for 
example, agree on more precise rules concerning the kind of environmental risks 
that may justify a trade- restrictive PPM measure. They could also agree, as in the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which contains several rules designed to 
address the specific interests of developing countries, on the manner in which the 
risks that PPM measures represent for the interests of developing countries should 
be taken into account.
In the meantime, disputes will continue to be brought before the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies. The ability of the panels and the Appellate Body to keep finding, 
on a case- by- case basis, balanced solutions and trade- offs in cases in which compet-
ing risks are at stake, will play a crucial role in giving more substance to the vision 
of the future that the achievement of sustainable development represents. It will 
also play an important role in the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system and 
the WTO.
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